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Previous studies on low-skilled single mothers generally focus on the binary
decisions of either welfare use or work. However, work among welfare partic-
ipants has increased steadily since the mid 1990s. This study estimates the
joint probability of the two decisions using a bivariate probit model. I investi-
gate the role of the 1993 EITC expansion on the decline of welfare caseloads.
Using monthly welfare use and work information from the Study of Income
and Program Participation, I find that the 1993 EITC expansion has at least
the same effect on reducing welfare use as the welfare reform initiatives, in
particular, welfare time limits. Moreover, the elasticity estimates indicate that
single mothers, especially those who were not employed and dependent solely
on welfare before the expansion, were more responsive to the EITC expansion
than to welfare time limits. Finally, the increase in work among welfare par-
ticipants is due to the relative ineffectiveness of the policies in reducing the
net population of those who are on welfare and work simultaneously.
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1 Introduction
The 1990s saw radical changes in means-tested transfer programs in the U.S. In
one such change, the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act
(PRWORA) replaced the long-lived Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
program with the Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF) program. By intro-
ducing a sixty-month time limit and a work requirement for eligibility,1 the TANF
ended cash assistance as an entitlement of needy families in the U.S. An equally dras-
tic change was the expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) program in
1993. In the 1990s, the maximum tax credit increased by more than fourfold and the
amount spent on the EITC by the federal government grew from 9.6 billion (in 1999
dollars) in 1990 to 32.2 billion dollars in 1999. During the same time and in con-
junction with an unprecedented expansion in the economy, total welfare caseloads
decreased to 2.3 million families in 1999 from 4.1 million in 1990. Focusing on low-
skilled single mothers, Figure 1(a) depicts the historical trends of welfare use and
employment using 1989 to 2000 data drawn from Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP).2 As we see, while employment increased by about 30% (from
45% to 58%) since 1995, welfare use declined sharply by about 70% (from 34% to
11%) among this group of low-skilled single mothers.
Aimed at improving work incentives among low-income families, the EITC is
a U.S. federal program that provides wage subsidies to working families. To be
eligible for the EITC program, a tax filer must have at least one child younger
than eighteen years old living with the family. The EITC program provides eligible
income tax filers with a tax credit based on three parameters: a phase-in range, a
maximum credit, and a phase-out range. The tax credit increases with an eligible
filer’s earnings while such earnings are in the phase-in range. Similarly, the tax
1Under certain conditions, states can grant exemptions from the time limit requirement, so long
as the total number of such exemptions does not exceed 20% of the state welfare caseload.
2The sample includes all single mothers who received no more than twelve years of schooling
and whose children are no older than eighteen years old. They are hence potentially eligible for
both the EITC and welfare programs. Employment is defined as having reported more than 10
hours of work in a week in the previous month.
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credit decreases with earnings when an eligible filer’s earnings are in the phase-out
range. When an eligible filer’s earnings are between the two ranges, the tax credit
will be given at the maximum credit level. Using the same table prepared by Hotz
and Scholz (2003), Table 1 repeats the EITC program parameters since it was first
launched in 1975.
In 1993, the EITC program was expanded. Before 1991, EITC did not distinguish
among families based on number of children in the family in the calculation of the tax
credit. After 1993, families with two or more children receive a significantly large tax
credit than those with one child. In 1994, families with two or more children could
receive a maximum EITC credit that was 24% more than that could be received by
their one-child counterparts ($2,528 as opposed to $2,038). This gap was widened to
33% in 1995 ($3,110 to $2,094), and then to 65% in 1996 ($3,556 to $2,152). Since
1996, the gap is unchanged, but the credit levels are adjusted according to the price
level. Families with more than one child also enjoy a higher phase-in rate, longer
phase-in range, and a higher phase-out rate, than their one-child counterparts.3
Numerous studies have focused on the effects of the EITC program on an indi-
vidual’s behavior in a variety of areas ranging from work to fertility (see Hotz and
Scholz (2003) for a review). However, not many studies focus on the possible effect
of the EITC program on single mothers’ welfare use. Studies on welfare caseload
have mainly focused on the effects of state welfare waivers and other initiatives in
the welfare reform, such as benefit reduction or welfare time limits (for example,
CEA (1997, 1999) and many studies that followed, see a review by Ochel (2004)).
As late as 2003, Grogger argues in his research that it “is the first study to provide
direct estimates of the effects of the EITC on welfare use.”
This research is different from previous studies in the following aspects. First, I
3Measured by earnings, more than three quarters of low-skilled working single mothers in SIPP
are eligible for EITC. Nationally, about 80 to 85% of the eligible families filed the credits, with an
average received credit at $1, 700 (see http://www.brookings.edu/es/urban/eitc/dataguide.htm).
Note that credits received and filed are generally not the same. About 13% of the filed credits
are used to offset the tax owed. See http://taxpolicycenter.org/TaxFacts/papers/irs eitc.pdf for a
further discussion on the assessing methodology.
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incorporate single mothers’ simultaneous decisions of welfare use and work through
estimating the joint probabilities of four states: (no work, no welfare), (work, no
welfare), (no work, welfare), and (work, welfare) using a bivariate probit model.
The conventional wisdom is that welfare participants do not work. As a result,
studies on poor families mostly focus on the binary decisions (i.e., marginal prob-
abilities) of either welfare use or work. Using the data from SIPP, however, I find
that, although the absolute number of welfare caseloads is decreasing, the ratio of
welfare participants who have reported ten or more hours of work in any given month
has increased form 8% in 1990 to 40% in 2000 (see Figure 1(b)). Hence it is of in-
terest to investigate the compositional change among the four states due to policy
changes. Such investigation can not be shown using the marginal probabilities of
either welfare or work.
Second, using the identification strategy developed in Hotz, Mullin, and Scholz
(2005), I contribute to welfare caseloads study by investigating the implication of
the expansion of the EITC program.4 Compared to many welfare reform initiatives
that put restrictions on welfare participants’ behavior, the EITC motivates partic-
ipants to leave welfare through a direct increase in their real wage and an indirect
accumulation in work experience. As a result, understanding the relative effective-
ness of different initiatives to reduce welfare caseloads may give us further insight
into designing better alternatives to move people from welfare to work.
The population I examine are single mothers who have received twelve years
or less of schooling, and whose youngest child no older than 18 years old, which
makes them potentially eligible for both welfare program and the EITC. I focus
on this particular group of mothers because they comprise the majority of welfare
recipients. The information used in this study is from SIPP during the period of
4The restriction of the identification strategy is that I can only assess the effectiveness of the
1993 EITC expansion on families with more than one child by the different treatments from families
with one child. However, the EITC program has been steadily expanded since 1986. It would be
of interest to evaluate the overall effectiveness of the EITC program by comparing eligible families
who were affected (mostly have children) to similar families that were not eligible (such as childless
single women).
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1989 to 2000. SIPP provides detailed information on monthly welfare use and work
decisions. Monthly information is essential to estimating the joint probabilities, as
annual data surveys such as March Current Population Survey or Panel Study of
Income Dynamics can make it appear that the annual welfare and work decisions
are made jointly.
The estimates of the bivariate probit model indicate that the 1993 EITC expan-
sion did not significantly differ the decisions of single mothers with two or more
children from their one-child counterpart until 1996. This corresponds to the steady
increase, which began in 1993, in the EITC “generosity” gap between families with
one child and those with two or more children. During the same period, welfare
time limits only affect single mothers whose youngest child is below five years old.
Taking into account welfare reform initiatives, state fixed-effect, business cycle fac-
tors, as well as a set of individual characteristics, the 1993 EITC expansion explains
about 2.6 percentage points of the decrease in the welfare use after 1993. At the
same time, welfare time limits explains about the same magnitude of the decline of
welfare caseloads.
The elasticity estimates show that the absolute values of the EITC elasticities on
four alternatives are all greater than those of the welfare time limits elasticities. This
indicates that single mothers react to the EITC expansion more strongly than they
do to welfare time limits. Also, of all single mothers, those who were not employed
and thus solely dependent on welfare before the expansion of the EITC were most
responsive to the EITC expansion.
The estimates also suggest that both policy changes significantly increase a low-
skilled single mother’s likelihood of relying solely on work without welfare, while it
almost uniformly decreases the likelihood of a mother’s reliance solely upon welfare,
or a combination of welfare and work. Notably, although the sign is negative, policy
changes seem to have minor effects on those welfare participants who had been
working, both in terms of the magnitude and the significance of the estimate. Hence,
it can be inferred that the increase in work among welfare participants is due to the
relative ineffectiveness of the policies on reducing the net population of those who
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simultaneously are on welfare and work.
However, estimation results also suggest that policy changes have their strongest
effects on reducing welfare use not among the youngest mothers (defined as being
in their 20s in the mid 1990s), but among the mothers in their 30s in the mid 1990s.
Finally, although a bivariate probit model essentially treats the sample as cross-
sectional, these estimates are fairly stable under a linear probability specification
that incorporates the individual fixed-effects.
The structure of this study is as follows: Section 2 provides a review of the
literature on the effects of the EITC and welfare reform on low-skilled single mothers’
work and welfare use decisions; Section 3 investigates the strategies used to identify
the effects of the expansion of the EITC program, as well as the needed identification
assumptions; Section 4 describes the empirical specification of the baseline estimator,
a bivariate probit model for a single mother’s welfare use and work decisions; Section
5 describes the sample used in this study; Section 6 discusses the estimation results;
and Section 7 gives the conclusions.
2 Review
Using a static consumption-leisure model, it is straightforward to show that the
EITC program provides an unambiguously positive effect on single mothers’ labor
force participation (Hotz and Scholz (2001)). Numerous studies provide empirical
support for this prediction (see Table 3).
Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) focus on cross-sectional samples.5 They use a
probit model of a single mother’s work decision derived from a static economic
5The samples consist of female heads of households between 19 to 44 years old from March CPS
during 1984 and 1996. They study the effects of changes to the EITC and other taxes, as well as
pre-reform welfare policies on a single woman’s work decision. Their primary focus is on the effects
of changes in monetary incentives. In their research, work is defined by whether a single mother
worked last week or whether she worked at all last year.
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model. Their primary specifications compare single women with children to those
without a child. The authors find that the EITC is the most important contributor
to the increase of labor force participation during the sample period, with a small
share of the increase attributable to changes in welfare policies, such as benefit
reduction and welfare waivers.6
Hotz, Mullin, and Scholz (2005) study the effect of the EITC on single mothers’
labor force participation. They use a longitudinal sample drawn from California’s
administrative data on welfare program participation, employment and earnings
between 1987 and 2000.7 They estimate the effect of the EITC program using a
difference-in-difference approach by comparing the employment status of families
with more than one child to families with one child before and after the 1993 EITC
expansion.8 Conditional on year, county and individual fixed-effects, their linear
probit model of work suggests that the EITC explains a significant portion of the
increase in the employment of California’s single mothers who have ever been on
welfare.9
Studies of welfare caseloads have mainly focused on the effects of changes in state
welfare waivers and other welfare reform initiatives, such as benefit reduction or
welfare time limits (for example, CEA (1997, 1999) and many studies that followed,
see a review by Ochel (2004)). Surprisingly, not many studies focus on the possible
effect of the EITC program on single mothers’ welfare participation (as distinct from
6In another specification, the also compare the difference between single mothers with two or
more children and (i) single women with no offspring (or with their youngest child older than
eighteen) and (ii) single mothers with only one child. The rationale for this comparison is that the
first group is not eligible for the EITC (nor AFDC), and the second group faces a different EITC
scheme since the 1993 expansion. The results are similar.
7In their sample, each single mother is observed consecutively for four years. Work is defined
as either having reported earnings to the UI system in a given year or having earnings exceeding
$500 and $1,000 in the year.
8As families with two or more children enjoy a much larger increase in the EITC that they can
earn beginning with the 1993 expansion than their one-child counterparts, the effect of the EITC,
holding everything else constant, should be greater for the former group.
9Furthermore, using tax data, they find that EITC-claiming behavior mirrors the employment
pattern in the data. Also, there is no significant difference in tax filing behaviors between families
with two children and families with more than two children. These findings reinforce the validity
of their identification strategy.
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labor force participation). As late as 2003, Grogger argues in his research that it “is
the first study to provide direct estimates of the effects of the EITC on welfare use.”
The main focus of Grogger (2003) is on the effects of welfare time limits and the
remaining welfare reform initiatives, as well as the EITC on welfare participation.
The dependent variables include welfare, employment, labor supply, earnings, and
income among female headed families. He uses a cross-sectional sample from the
March CPS survey between 1979 and 2000.
The effects of welfare time limit are estimated using a difference-in-difference
approach developed in Grogger and Michalopoulos (2003).10 The treatment and
control groups are families with their youngest child below thirteen years old and
families with their youngest child above thirteen years old, respectively. The ratio-
nale is that the younger the youngest child is in a family, the more valuable the
insurance purpose of the welfare program will be to the family. Facing the new,
sixty-month time limit,11 single mothers with younger children will react to to the
time limit more strongly than families that have their youngest child above thirteen,
as they are approaching the welfare ineligibility age (eighteen years old) and will be
ineligible for welfare benefits before or at the point that the time limit would affect
them.
As for the effects of the EITC program, Grogger uses the maximum credit as
a representation of the overall generosity of the EITC. The effects of the EITC
expansion on female heads’ different outcomes are estimated by using the differential
treatments in the maximum credits on families with one child and those with more
than one child. He finds that, the increase of the EITC maximum credit between
1993 and 1999 explains 15.8% of the decline in welfare use during this period, while
about one-eighth of the decline can be attributed to welfare time limits. Based
on his research, he concludes that the EITC has a larger effect on reducing single
10Grogger and Michalopoulos (2003) study the effect of welfare time limits using data from a
randomly designed experiment in Florida’s Family Transition Program.
11Not all states adopted a time limit of sixty months. See Table 2 for the exact length in each
state. In this study I use the exact lengths and dates listed in Table 2 to construct all time-limit
variables.
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mothers’ welfare participation than do welfare time limit.
An immediate concern to Grogger (2003) is that, as the EITC parameters are
adjusted annually, and are also correlated with the number of children the applicant
has, the linear structure adopted by Grogger may suffer from a near-multicollinearity
problem.12 Grogger adopts a difference-in-difference framework where the outcome
is a linear function of the level of the maximum EITC credit and the interaction
term between the credit and age of the youngest child. Further, he also includes in
the explanatory variables the year fixed-effects and the number of children a family
has. Although the credit and the interaction terms themselves are not perfectly
linear in year and the number of children, they are very closely related. If such near
multicollinearity does exist, the estimates may be imprecise due to large standard
errors.
I attempt to address this issue in two ways. First, to study the linear relationships
between these variables, I estimate an OLS regression of the real maximum credit on
single mother’s number of children and year dummies (see Table 4). The estimation
indicates that both R2 and R̄2 are at 94.6%.13 The R2 and R̄2 of regressing the
interaction term on the same set of explanatory variables are both at 88% (Table
5). Both of the two estimations suggest a near-linear relationship. Moreover, when
similar multicollinearity tests are applied to other explanatory variables used in
Grogger (2003), none of the R2 of the estimations are more than 10% (the results
are not shown here).
Second, of Grogger (2003)’s regressions of the effect of the EITC maximum credit
on six outcomes mentioned above, only its effect on welfare use (identified by the in-
teraction between the maximum credit and age of the youngest child) is significant.14
12Also, the variation in the magnitude of the maximum credit will not be able to capture the
full impact of the EITC on single mothers’ behaviors. This is due to the fact that the received
credit (hence the effective EITC tax rate) is endogenous to an applicant’s work decision and not
all applicants for the EITC receive maximum credit.
13The sample is constructed by using an annual sample of single mothers by using National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 79 under similar conditions to that constructed by Grogger (2003).
14Also significant are the coefficients of the maximum credit on employment, weeks worked, and
earnings.
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As one of the typical symptoms of multicollinearity includes that the coefficients of
the variables in question are generally not statistically significant, Grogger’s out-
comes seem to suggest the existence of multicollinearity and raise an issue of iden-
tification. In fact, when I use the EITC identification strategy of Hotz, Mullin, and
Scholz (2003) and estimate similar regressions, the estimated effects of the EITC
are significant for most of the dependent variables (results not shown here).
A different consideration is that, in theory, a single mother’s welfare use and work
decisions are correlated, as she decides jointly her work and welfare use decisions.
Hence, the marginal probabilities of welfare and work form a system of simultaneous
equations. In principle, if we do not take into account the effect of one decision (say,
work) when investigating the other (in this case, welfare use), the estimator will be
biased due to the omitted variable problem.
To this end, Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001)’s study of female household heads’
work assumes that all non-working single mothers participate in welfare, and also
construct a probability of participating in welfare given work as one of the explana-
tory variables. Hotz, Mullin, and Scholz (2003) use a sample of single mothers who
received welfare at some point in the sample period to study the effect of the EITC
on work. As a result, it can be viewed as the work probability given use of welfare.
On the other hand, Grogger (2003) treats work and welfare use as two indepen-
dent decisions, and does not control the likelihood of one decision in estimating the
probability of the other decision.
Assuming that single mothers make two binary decisions about work and welfare
use, there are four possible outcome states, (no work, no welfare), (work, no welfare),
(no work, welfare), and (work, welfare). However, if relatively few single mothers
choose to be on welfare and work simultaneously in reality, the bias, even if it
exists, will be small. As a result, it is important to examine the extent to which the
simultaneity issue exists in the data.
As eligibility for AFDC is determined monthly, it is also possible that the monthly
decisions of welfare use and work are disjointed, yet the annual welfare and work
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decisions reported in March CPS or PSID can look like that they are made jointly.15
Unlike March CPS or PSID, SIPP has a rich set of histories on each individual’s
monthly hours of work and AFDC receipts information, dating back to as early as
1989. As a result, I can use SIPP to investigate the simultaneity nature of single
mothers’ decisions.16 If a significant number of single mothers in SIPP chose to be
on welfare and work simultaneously, ignoring the joint nature is likely to lead to a
serious bias.
Figure 1(b) shows the conditional distribution of the mean status of single moth-
ers’ work given welfare status from 1989 to 2000. The sample comes from all SIPP
single mothers who received twelve years or less schooling and whose youngest child
is no older than eighteen years old (hence qualify for both the EITC and the welfare
program). As the eligibility of welfare system, to a large extent, is determined by an
individual’s work status in the preceding month, work is defined as having reported
at least 10 hours of work per week in the previous month. It should be noted that
the statistics for the year 2000 are not as accurate as those in the previous years
due to its relatively small number of sample observations.
The most significant phenomena shown in the figure is the large increase since
1995 of welfare participants who chose to work. In 1989 this ratio was at about 8%.
It slowly increased to about 11% in 1995 and then jumped to about 20% in 1996.
In 2000 about 40% of all welfare participants were working for at least 10 hours per
week. At the same time, the proportion of work among non-participants remains
fairly stable at about 60%. Combined with the fact that there is a 10 percentage
points increase in the overall employment and a 20 percentage points decrease in
the welfare caseloads during the same period of time (see Figure 1(a), this shows a
significant compositional change in the four states of decisions among single mothers.
17
15Thanks to Professor John Karl Scholz for pointing out this issue.
16I combine 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1996 panels to form the sample. See a further discussion
in Section 5.
17One would expect that, the ratio of (work, welfare) decreases as we restrain the definition of
work. If work is defined as having worked for more than 120 hours a month (i.e., 30 hours per
week), welfare participants who worked in the previous month decrease from 16% to 9%.
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3 Identification
To identify the effect of the 1993 EITC expansion I follow the strategy proposed
by Hotz, Mullin, and Scholz (2006). As families with more than one child enjoy a
much more generous EITC scheme than their one-child counterparts, we can consider
families with one child as the control group and those with more than one child as the
treatment group, assuming that the decision making processes of the two groups are
similar in the face of a similar socioeconomic environment. Hence, a difference-in-
difference (DD) approach can be used to estimate the effect of the EITC expansion.
Under this DD approach, the identification comes from a comparison of differences in
behaviors between these two types of families before and after the EITC expansion.18
For the effects of welfare reform, I follow Grogger and Michalopoulos (2003)
and Grogger (2003, 2004) and focus mainly on welfare time limits. I follow Grog-
ger’s identification strategy, where he estimates the effect by using a difference-in-
difference approach, where the first source of variation comes from the time varia-
tions in the states’ adopting the new time limits.19 The second source of variation
comes from the fact that families with youngest child over thirteen will not be af-
fected by the 60-month time limit. I further separate families who are likely to be
Also, one may worry about the accuracy of the welfare office in keeping track of applicants’ work
status. In the GAO 1996 report on welfare waiver implementation, it is mentioned that keeping
accurate records of welfare eligibility was the main goal of welfare offices.
18Since Hotz, Mullin, and Scholz include a mother’s fixed-effect in the probability model, only
mothers who have changed status during the sample period are included in their estimation. As
a result their identification comes from families that change status from one child to two or more
children or vice versa.
A different way to estimate the effect of the EITC program is by using the annual variation in
the tax rates. Assuming that the effect of the effective EITC tax rate is continuous, Meyer and
Rosenbaum (2001) study the effect of the EITC program on single mothers’ work decisions, while
Grogger (2003) focuses on the welfare use decision among single mothers. As the effective EITC
tax rate is determined by how much a single mother earns in labor income in a given year, it is
endogenous. Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) calculate an “expected tax” that a woman would pay in
a given state and year with a given family composition and ages of children, derived by integrating
over distributions of single mothers’ wages and hours. On the other hand, Grogger (2003) uses the
different levels of maximum EITC benefits faced by families with different numbers of children.
19Fourteen states included a time-limit in their waivers before 1996, while all states were required
to have welfare time limits after 1996. Table 2 sets out the information on state waivers and TANF.
Note that Michigan and Illinois use state funds to pay for welfare benefits after participants reach
sixty months. As a result, they essentially have no time limit.
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affected by the limits into three groups: under five years old, between five and ten
years old, and between ten and thirteen years old.
Given that a work requirement is often combined with other initiatives that may
have mixed incentives (for example, a lower effective tax rate on earning), I use
whether a state has implemented a work requirement on welfare participants to
represent the remainder of the initiatives other than welfare time limits. To esti-
mate the composite effects of the whole bundle of initiatives that come with work
requirement, I rely solely on the time variation when the state implemented their
versions.
Further, I include year and state fixed effects to control for the business cycle and
unobserved state-level characteristics that are unchanged over time. By the use of
these dummy variables, I essentially control for effects from concurrent events that
are neutral to the age of the youngest child and the number of children in a family.
In order to ensure that the DD estimator identifies the effect of the EITC ex-
pansion alone, one requirement is that the effects of concurrent events are invariant
with the number of children a single mother has. This may be the most problematic
assumption. For example, if a work requirement has different effects on families with
different number of children, it will also be captured in the DD estimator. One way
to test this assumption is to adopt a difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) ap-
proach that allows a work requirement imposed by welfare reform to interact with
the EITC expansion. Although ten states have included a work requirement in their
state waivers, I do not have enough variation in the data to test whether the effect
of the work requirement is invariant with the number of children of a single mother.
Also, one may be concerned about the effects of policy changes on a mother’s
marital status and childbearing decisions. The expansion of the EITC changes the
effective marginal tax rates on labor income. On the one hand, single mothers who
have little or no labor income can receive a marriage subsidy by marrying a similarly
situated man, given that their combined income is still in the EITC phase-in range.
On the other hand, couples may choose to dissolve their marriage because staying
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together is financially disadvantageous.20 One solution to this problem which was
used by Keane and Wolpin (2006) is to combine marriage, childbearing, work, and
welfare use decisions together in a dynamic structural model. For simplicity however,
I treat these decisions as exogenous in this research.
Furthermore, one crucial assumption of a valid difference-in-difference estimator
is the parallel trend between treatment and control groups. That is, the trend of the
treatment group would have been the same as the control group had the treatment
group not experienced the policy change. This assumption can be checked by inves-
tigating whether there is a difference in the behaviors between the treatment and
control groups before the policy change took place. If there is no pre-expansion dif-
ference between these two groups, we will have more confidence in the assumption.
To do so I use the interaction term between individual year and two-and-more chil-
dren indicators to estimate the effects of the EITC expansion. It the parallel trend
assumption is correct, the estimates of the interaction terms between the number of
children indicator and the year indicators before 1993 should be insignificant.
4 A Bivariate Probit Model of A Single Mother’s
Welfare Use and Work Decisions
Assuming a single mother chooses simultaneously whether to be on welfare (W )
and to work (H) in each period, there are at least four alternatives: (No Work, No
Welfare), (Work, No Welfare), (No Work, Welfare) and (Work, Welfare).
To estimate the joint probability of a mother’s simultaneous decisions of welfare
20 Using a linear probability of marriage decision of single mothers shows that the expansion is
associated with an increase in a mother’s likelihood to marry by a small, yet significant, 2.4%. Also,
as the expansion sharply increases the credit gap between one-child families and those with two
or more children, single mothers with one child may want to have another child. Estimates of the
childbearing decision among low-income mothers show that the expansion does have a significant,
but small, positive-effect.
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use and work, I assume it can be described by a bivariate probit model. Following
the standard argument of a probit model, the stochastic (unobserved) part of (W ,
H), (W ∗, H∗), is continuous and can be written as:
































− t indicates the year-month dummy variable. I use SIPP monthly information
from January of 1989 to December of 2000.
− Di,2+Kids,t = 1 if i has more than one child.
− Dl is the year-month dummy variable. Dl = 1, if t = l.
− Di,j,t = 1 if i’s youngest child is under five years old (j = 1), between five and
ten years old (j = 2), and between ten and thirteen years old (j = 3) in t,
respectively.
− Di,timelimit,t = 1 indicates i lives in a state with some form of time limits in t.
− D
i,kids=k,l is the dummy for number of kids. Di,kids=k,t = 1, if i has k kids in
t.
− Dist is the state dummy to control for unobserved state generosity towards
poor families. Dist = 1, if individual i lives in state s in t.
− Dy is the year dummy. I control business cycle factor up to the year level.
− Di,workreq,l is the dummy for work requirement. Di,workreq,l = 1 if individual
i lives in a state with work requirement in year t.
− Xist includes mother-specific characteristics, including age, years of schooling,
age of youngest child, income other than earned and AFDC benefit,21 and race
indictors, including black and hispanics dummies.
21All monetary terms are deflated into real 2000 dollars by Personal Consumption Expenditure
Deflator, PCED.
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− εWi is the random error, which we assume to be distributed normally.









1 if H∗ > 0
0 if otherwise
(2)
Assume the two random errors (εWi , ε
H
i ) can be described by a bivariate normal















where ρ is the correlation coefficient between a mother’s welfare use and work deci-
sions. Based on the observation from Figure 1, we can expect ρ to be negative. To
further exclude the effects of explanatory variables of work from welfare use, I also
include in Equation (2) two additional variables that affect a single mother’s likeli-
hood of work but not her welfare use. First, I include the annual AFDC effective
tax rate on earned income calculated by Terra, Sanders, and Smith (1999), because
given two mothers with the same characteristics, the one who lives in a state with
higher effective tax rate on earned income should be less likely to work than the one
who lives in a low tax rate state. Second, I also include the expected probability
of work estimated from a sample of females who have no child. The idea is that
this predicted probability of work, even estimated from a population who are not
eligible for welfare, should be correlated with work decision of those mothers who are
eligible for welfare. However, given that the population are not eligible for welfare,
the estimated probabilities should be uncorrelated with the welfare use decision.22
A final issue is that, since I have repeated observations on a same mother, I control
for intra-class correlation to obtain a robust standard deviation. This completes the
econometric structure of the estimation.
22Using the constructed sample of unskilled single mothers who are eligible for welfare, the
estimated likelihood of work is only correlated with welfare use at a 10% confidence level.
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In this specification, β1 captures the effect of the EITC program on welfare use
among single mothers. The identification comes from comparing the pre- and post-
EITC expansion differences between families who have only one child and those
who have more than one child. Also, β2j, j = 1, 2, 3 captures the effect of welfare
time limits on single mothers who have children that are below five, between five
and ten, and between ten and thirteen years old, respectively. This is identified
by comparing the difference in pre- and post-time limits behaviors between single
mothers whose youngest child is below thirteen years old and those whose children
are above thirteen. To identify both β1 and β2j together I rely on the fact that the
two policies have different target groups. Time limits only affect single mothers who
have children that are below thirteen years old, while the expansion of the EITC
affects families with two or more children. As a result, the two policy effects entered
into the specification additively.
β4s and β5l capture the possible state (s) and year (l) fixed effects that are un-
observed by econometricians. For example, a state that set a time limit before
PRWORA (observed variable), may also be less generous to its support of low-
income families (unobserved variable), and in turn, poor families residing in this
state are also less likely to be on welfare. Another important issue regarding welfare
use is the effect of business cycles. For example, it is well known that the recession
in the early 1990s was an important cause of the sudden surge in welfare use during
that same period of time.
Since most state welfare programs are operated at the county level, a better con-
trol than state fixed-effect is to use county fixed-effect, as in Hotz, Mullin, and Scholz
(2005). Because the data from which I draw my sample (SIPP) does not provide
county information, however, I am not able to control for the county socioeconomic
conditions.23 Another issue is that, with the existence of an unobserved individ-
ual fixed-effect, the estimation of the probabilities based on observed factors is not
23I also estimate the model using a sample of single mothers drawn from NLSY 79, which
enables me to control for the county-level socioeconomic factors that may affect a single mother’s
decisions. I control for unemployment rate, proportion of female headed households to total number
of households, per capita transfer payments, and county poverty rate among female heads. But
the results are similar to those reported in Section 6.
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consistent. However, due to the nonlinear nature of the bivariate probit model, we
cannot eliminate the individual fixed-effect by subtracting the individual mean from
raw data, as is typically done in a linear probability specification. As a result, the
bivariate probit model is essentially treating the sample as cross-sectional.
The inability of controlling for the unobserved individual characteristics is an
important disadvantage of using a non-linear probability model. A linear (binary)
probability model with individual fixed effect, however, is not suitable for the pur-
pose of this study, which involves the joint nature of welfare use and work decisions.
In Section 6.2, I compare the estimates between the joint probit model and lin-
ear probability model with fixed effect to evaluate the seriousness of unobserved
individual heterogeneity.24
5 Data and Sample
The sample used in this research comes from pooling the monthly information of
the SIPP 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1996 panels. Given the different lengths of
the SIPP panels, the sample spans over the years from 1989 through 2000, which
includes five years before and seven years after the expansion of the EITC program
in 1994. The population I examine in this study includes low-skilled single mothers
who are potentially eligible for both the EITC and the welfare programs. A low-
skilled single mother is defined as having received twelve years of schooling or less.
One of the eligibility requirements of both welfare and the EITC programs is that
a mother’s youngest child be no older than eighteen years old. I define my sample
accordingly. Note that due to the wave structure of the SIPP, I have fewer numbers
of observations in 1989 and in 2000.
Note that SIPP is known for at least two potential issues that may have potential
24Given the relatively short panel lengths of different SIPP panels, the effects are mostly esti-
mated through comparisons between mothers from different panels. This is one disadvantage of
the SIPP compared to long panels such as NLSY 79.
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implications to the research in interest. First, the seam bias, i.e., participants report
the same information for every month in a wave, may lead us to erroneously identify
the effect by the information from reference month one. Given that I have detailed
monthly information on dates of state waiver program and TANF implementation,
I use monthly information. The seam bias is controlled by following Blank and
Ruggles (1996), where I add an indicator variable for reference month one. Also, it
should be noted that SIPP participants tend to under-report their income sources
from programs.
Figure 1 depicts the historical trends of welfare use and work (defined as having
reported working for ten hours or more in the previous month) among my target
group. Table 6 lists the weighted sample descriptives.25 There are 145,291 mother-
months (observed from 8,792 mothers distributed across the five SIPP panels). The
mean welfare use and work are at 18% and 52%, respectively. More than half of the
sample mothers in each year have two or more children. In particular, about 57%
of the sample mothers before 1995 had two or more children, but the same ratio
increased to 77% after 1995. As discussed in Section 3, one of the assumption is
that policy changes are uncorrelated with a single mother’s childbearing decision.
The sample statistic seems to suggest that the EITC expansion is associated with
an increase in the likelihood of having two or more children among low-skilled single
mothers. However, I do not deal with this issue in this study (see also footnote 20).
For the welfare reform initiatives, about 33% of the sample reside in a state with
some form of work requirements. Also, 23% of the sample mothers have a youngest
child younger than five years old and reside in a state with some form of time limits.
The same ratios for sample mothers who have a youngest child aged between five
and ten years old and between ten and thirteen, are at 8% and 2%, respectively.
As for their individual characteristics, they have received for 10.8 years of school-
ing and aged at 508 months (42 years old) at the interview on average. They also
have $2,275 real 2000 dollars of other income (income other than earned and welfare
25I re-weight the sample based on the SIPP panel weights, assuming that each panel has the
same significance.
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incomes). 34% of them only have one child. 29% are black. 55% live with multiple
families (relatives or cohabiting). Finally, 12% of them have their youngest children




The first two columns of Table 7 show the coefficient estimates of the policy effects
(β̂) using the bivariate probit model described in Section 4.26 As expected, the
estimate for the correlation coefficient (ρ̂) between welfare use and work is negative
at -.63.
As have been discussed in Section 3, an underlying assumption for the validity
of a difference-in-difference estimator is a parallel trend between the control and
the treatment groups. As we see in Table 7, none of the DD estimates on welfare
use nor work decisions before 1995 are significant. It implies that there are no
significant differences in the pre-expansion trends between families with one child
and those with more than one child. These estimates give us some confidence in the
identification strategy.
Next, I calculate changes in the marginal probabilities of welfare use and work
decisions due to changes in the policy variables using the bivariate probit estimates.
The results are shown in the last two columns of Table 7.
There are several noteworthy points. First, the EITC expansion did not affect
single mothers’ decisions until 1996. This corresponds to the widening gap in the
26For the purpose of simple presentation, I do not report the estimates of other explanatory vari-
ables which include year- and state-fixed effects, individual characteristics mentioned in Equation
A.1, and two excluded variables used in the work latent variable equation.
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EITC generosities that began in 1993 between families with one child and those with
two or more children. For example, families with two or more children received only
$490 (or 24%) more in the maximum EITC credit than their one-child counterparts.
The gap increased to $1,006 (33% more) in 1995, and then further to $1,404 (65%
more) in 1996. The gap is unchanged since 1996, but the credit levels are adjusted
according to the price index (see Table 1).
Starting from 1996, the EITC expansion significantly reduced welfare use among
low-skilled single mothers by 3.8, 7.3, 8.4, and 5.6 percentage points annually in
1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999, respectively, compared to the 1993 level. In 2000, this
effect, although still negative (-4.4 percentage points), is not significant. These
estimates suggest that the 1993 and subsequent expansion in the EITC program
plays an important role in explaining the decrease in welfare use among families
with more than one child.
As for the effects of welfare time limits, the estimates exhibit a similar pattern
to that of the effects of the EITC expansion, but the effects are limited to the
group of single mothers who have the youngest, youngest child. Welfare time limits
decrease the likelihood of welfare use for a single mother who has her youngest child
no older than five years old by about 2.4%, and increase her likelihood of work by
about 5.8%. For single mothers whose youngest child is older, the effects are not
significant. The directions of some of the estimates are even reversed.27 Finally, the
remaining initiatives of the welfare reform, roughly represented by whether a state
has enacted a work requirement, do not significantly change welfare use for any of
the three sub-age groups.
Table 8 reports the average, rather than annual, effects of the policy changes over
the period from 1994 to 2000.28 The first two columns list the average effects on the
27Note the comparison group here is the mothers who have their youngest children aged between
thirteen to eighteen years old. The estimates on the second youngest group are fairly insignificant,
and are not stable over different specifications. However, time limit seems to have pushed the
group of mothers who have children aged between ten and thirteen to speed up their welfare use.
28The average EITC effect is estimated by a DD estimator where a 1993 Plus indicator, rather
than annual indicators, is used as the first difference. Note that the estimates for welfare time
limits and work requirements are not statistically different between annual and average effects
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two binary decisions. The expansion explains about 2.6 percentage points decrease
in welfare use among this group of low-skilled single mothers after 1993. Data used
to draw Figure 1 suggests that in 1993, the welfare participation rate among this
group of low-skilled single mothers is at about 30.7%. By the end of the 1990s, the
same rate is at only 11.2%. As a result, the 1993 and consequent expansion in the
EITC program explains for about 13% (= 2.6
30.7−11.2%) of the decrease in the welfare
participation rate. In the mean time, welfare time limits (on the below five years
old group) explains for about the same magnitude of the decline in welfare use if
the low-skilled single mothers.
The last two columns of Table 8 further distinguishes the effects of policy changes
on a mother’s likelihood of choosing between the four different welfare/work alter-
natives. Ideally, we would like welfare participants to be able to support themselves
through employment and hence leave welfare. This suggests that one way to eval-
uate the success of a policy is its effectiveness on increasing the (no welfare, work)
alternative. In this perspective, both the EITC expansion and the welfare reform
have succeeded. Based on the estimates, both policy changes significantly increase
a low-skilled single mother’s likelihood of the ideal state, i.e., work and not on
welfare, while it almost uniformly decreases the likelihoods of a mother’s all other
alternatives.29
Also, as we see from the table, since policy changes affect the four alternatives
very unevenly, investigating the marginal probabilities of either welfare use or work
alone masks significant compositional changes. Notably, although the sign is nega-
tive, the expansion seems to have a minor effect on those welfare participants who
were already working, both in terms of the magnitude and the significance of the
estimate.30 Combined with the fact that there is a net increase in the marginal
estimations, except for the work effect of time limits on single mothers with the youngest, youngest
child group.
29Note that the definition of work used here is having reported ten hours or more of work a week
in the previous month. The higher the condition is, the lower the ratio of people will be qualified
as “working”.
30By the estimation framework, we are only able to know the net effects of the policy changes
on these alternatives. One potential explanation of the ineffectiveness of the EITC expansion on
the (welfare, work) alternative is that as the EITC increases the likelihood of work (an increase
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probability of work, it is clear that the main driving force of the increase in the
work likelihood due to the EITC is from people who left welfare after the expan-
sion. Further, this disproportional decrease also explains the sharp increase in work
among welfare participants in the late 1990s as seen in Figure 1(b). That is, due
to the shrink of the group of people who are not working and rely solely on welfare
and the relative stable population of those who are simultaneously on welfare and
working, the ratio of work among welfare participants increase.
To evaluate the relative effectiveness of policies Table 9 calculates the elasticities
of the explanatory variables, evaluated at the sample mean. The elasticity captures
the percentage change in the decision variable due to the change in one’s status, i.e.,
change in the applicability of a certain policy. There are some noteworthy points
based on the elasticity estimates. First, the (welfare, no work) alternative is the
most responsive one to both policy changes. This can be viewed as another support
of the success of the EITC and the welfare reform. As both policies are targeting
low-income families, which are most susceptible of falling into this category, the
responsiveness indicates that these two policies are effectively affecting their target
group. Second, we see that the absolute values of the EITC elasticities are all greater
than their welfare time-limit counterparts. It implies that single mothers react to the
EITC expansion more strongly than the welfare time limits. Judging by the relative
responsiveness of the targeted population to different policies, it can be said that
the rewarding policy, i.e., the EITC, is more effective in motivating single mothers
to leave the undesired status than the punishing policy, i.e., the welfare time limit.
Finally, as age is an important indicator of the life experience of a single mother,
it is of interest to see if mothers of different age groups react differently to the policy
changes. In particular, it is ideal if policies can move younger mothers from welfare
dependence and joblessness to independently supporting themselves. I separate low-
skilled single mothers into three groups: born in 1965 and after (and hence below 30
when the policies took place in the mid 1990s), born in between 1956 and 1964, and
in (welfare, work), holding welfare constant), it also reduces that of welfare use (an decrease in
(welfare, work), holding work constant).
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born before 1956, then re-estimated the model for the three sub-age groups. The
results are shown in Table 10.
The magnitudes of the results indicate that, as mother ages, the EITC expansion
plays an increasingly more significant role in increasing the likelihood of work (How-
ever, they are not statistically different from each other). In the mean time, EITC
has its strongest effect on reducing the welfare use among single mothers who were
born in between 1956 and 1965 (hence were mostly in their 30s in the mid 1990s,
when both policies took place). In fact, using similarly defined sample of single
mothers from NLSY 79 (who were born in the same period of time), I get estimates
of comparable magnitudes. On the other hand, for younger mothers who were born
after 1965, although the signs are correct, neither policy has significant effects on
either their welfare use or work decisions. Based on this result, a further study may
be needed to investigate the relative effectiveness of policies on this particular group
of people.
6.2 Identification Check
One of most important disadvantages of a non-linear probability model is that we
can not control the individual fixed-effect by the standard first difference method.
Due to this restriction, the bivariate probit model essentially treats SIPP sample
as cross-sectional. To see if the unobserved individual characteristics impose a sig-
nificant restriction, I estimate linear probability models of welfare use and work
with individual fixed-effects. The results are reported in Table 11. The detailed
specification of the linear probability model is discussed in Appendix A.1
Compared with the linear probability model, the bivariate probit model esti-
mates that the effects of EITC expansion on welfare use and work are fairly stable.
In general, the bivariate probit model shows slightly weaker policy effects on welfare
use and higher effects on work. This is especially true for the effect of the EITC
expansion. Furthermore, linear probability models return more significant results.
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Under the specification, welfare time limits also play a significant role in reducing
welfare use (however, also reducing work) among mothers whose youngest child is
between five and ten years old. Furthermore, the remaining welfare reform initia-
tives, roughly represented by whether a state has implemented work requirements,
seem to increase the welfare use among low-skilled single mothers under the linear
probability framework.
The estimation of the linear probability model is different from the bivariate
probit model in that I also include an individual fixed-effect to control for the effects
from unobserved individual heterogeneity. In this sense, the comparison between the
estimates of the bivariate probit model and the linear probability model is also a
check of the seriousness of the potential bias induced by unobserved heterogeneity.
The estimates seem to suggest that the unobserved individual characteristics affect
the likelihood of having youngest children younger than thirteen years old more than
the decision of having one or two or more children. As a result, once we control it
by adding the individual fixed-effect, the real welfare reform effects are revealed.31
Finally, one of the underlying identifying assumption is that the EITC expansion
has the same effect on families with two or more children. In Table 12, I test this
assumption by examining whether there are differences between families with two
children and those with three or more children. The results indicate that, except for
very few years, the DD estimators for the EITC effects are not significant. Generally
speaking, these two types of families do not exhibit significant differences in their
behaviors. This provides further evidence about the validity of the identification
strategy of the EITC expansion effect.
31One may worry about the significance of the welfare reform coefficients in the linear probability
model are due to its distributional assumption. If this is true, a linear probability model without
controlling for individual fixed-effect is also likely to have a negative estimate on these coefficients.
Based on results not shown here, this is not the case. When individual fixed-effect is not present, the
negative effect of the time limit, for example, disappears and turns positive (and also insignificant).
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7 Concluding Remarks
The 1990s saw a significant focus on mechanisms to reduce welfare caseloads. The
overall public policy goal was to reduce welfare and increase work among poor fam-
ilies with dependent children. Among the major public policies aiming at achieving
the above purposes, this study focuses on the effects of the expansion in the EITC
program in 1993 and welfare time limits.
Previous studies on the subject generally focus on welfare participation and work
as two separate decisions, and have not considered them as a joint decision. Assum-
ing people can choose to be on welfare and to work simultaneously, we have four
possible alternatives: (work, no welfare), (no work, no welfare), (no work, welfare)
and (work, welfare). The purpose of many public programs are essentially trying to
move people from the last two groups to the first one. The disadvantage of treating
them as separate decisions is that we will not know how policies affect these four
welfare/work alternatives.
Using a bivariate probit model of welfare use and work decisions, the estimates
indicate that, conditional on welfare reform initiatives, state fixed-effect, business
cycle factors, as well as a set of individual characteristics, the EITC expansion
explains for about 2.6 percentage points decrease in the welfare use after 1993. In
the mean time, welfare time limits explains for about the same magnitude of the
decline of welfare caseloads.
Also, the estimates suggest that both policy changes significantly increase a low-
skilled single mother’s likelihood of the ideal state, i.e., (work, no welfare), while it
almost uniformly decreases the likelihoods of a mother’s selection of the alternative
states. Furthermore, the increase in work among welfare participants is mostly
due to the relative ineffectiveness of the policies that are able to reduce the net
population of those who are simultaneously on welfare and working.
The elasticity estimates show that the absolute values of the EITC elasticities on
four alternatives are all greater than those of welfare time limits elasticities. This
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indicates that single mothers react to the EITC expansion more strongly than the
welfare time limits. Among them, those who were not employed and dependent
solely on welfare before the expansion were most responsive to the EITC expansion.
There are two related questions for my further investigation. First, it is important
to further investigate single mothers who are neither working nor on welfare. This
group of mothers comprise a large proportion of my sample. A glance at the data
indicates that they are not unlike their counterparts in other groups in terms of
financial status. However, a more careful examination is needed to know why and
how they remain both jobless and welfare-less. A second and more sophisticated
question is whether the EITC expansion or welfare reform affect a single mothers’
occupational choices. An understanding of the factors that affect single mothers
occupation choices is important as such information could be used to design more
effective job-training programs. A first glance at the data indicates that single
mothers who were working before the EITC expansion “move up” to jobs that require
more skills than the jobs obtained by their counterparts who were not working. This
may suggest that (i), their work experience is able to help them find better jobs; or
(ii), financial incentives might motivate them to search harder for a better job.
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9 Tables and Graphs
Table 1: Earned Income Tax Credit Parameters, 1979-2001
Year Phase-in Phase-in Max Phase-out Phase-out
Rate (%) Range Credit Rate (%) Range
1975-78 10 $0-$4,000 $400 10 $4,000 -$8,000
1979-84 10 0-5,000 500 12.5 6,000 - 10,000
1985-86 11 0-5,000 550 12.22 6,500 - 11,000
1987 14 0-6,080 851 10 6,920 - 15,432
1988 14 0-6,240 874 10 9,840 - 18,576
1989 14 0-6,500 910 10 10,240 - 19,340
1990 14 0-6,810 953 10 10,730 - 20,264
1991a 16.711 0-7,140 1,192 11.93 11,250 -21,250
17.322 1,235 12.36 11,250 - 21,250
1992a 17.611 0-7,520 1,324 12.57 11,840 -22,370
18.422 1,384 13.14 11,840 - 22,370
1993a 18.511 0-7,750 1,434 13.21 12,200 -23,050
19.522 1,511 13.93 12,200 - 23,050
1994 23.611 0-7,750 2,038 15.98 11,000 -23,755
30.022 0-8,245 2,528 17.68 11,000 -25,296
7.6533 0-4,000 306 7.65 5,000 -9,000
1995 34.011 0-6,160 2,094 15.98 11,290 -24,396
36.022 0-8,640 3,110 20.22 11,290 -26,673
7.6533 0-4,100 314 7.65 5,130 -9,230
1996 34.011 0-6,330 2,152 15.98 11,610 -25,078
40.022 0-8,890 3,556 21.06 11,610 -28,495
7.6533 0-4,220 323 7.65 5,280 -9,500
1997 34.011 0-6,500 2,210 15.98 11,930 -25,750
40.022 0-9,140 3,656 21.06 11,930 -29,290
7.6533 0-4,340 332 7.65 5,430 -9,770
1998 34.011 0-6,680 2,271 15.98 12,260 -26,473
40.022 0-9,390 3,756 21.06 12,260 -30,095
7.6533 0-4,460 341 7.65 5,570 -10,030
1999 34.011 0-6,800 2,312 15.98 12,460 -26,928
40.022 0-9,540 3,816 21.06 12,460 -30,580
7.6533 0-4,530 347 7.65 5,670 -10,200
2000 34.011 0-6,920 2,353 15.98 12,690 -27,413
40.022 0-9,720 3,888 21.06 12,690 -31,152
7.6533 0-4,610 353 7.65 5,770 -10,380
Source: Hotz and Scholz (2003), Table 1. All are in nominal dollars.
a Basic credit only. Does not include supplemental young child or
health insurance credits. 1 Taxpayers with one qualifying child. 2



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4: Multicollinearity Between Real Maximum Credit
and Other Explanatory Variables
Variables
1979 -1522.78*** 1990 -1391.71***
(38.795) (38.911)
1980 -1624.31*** 1991 -1131.21***
(38.762) (38.984)
1981 -1701.24*** 1992 -1016.08***
(38.743) (39.068)
1982 -1747.50*** 1993 -920.61***
(38.740) (39.227)
1983 -1780.67*** 1994 -190.94***
(38.733) (39.384)
1984 -1808.83*** 1995 -133.80***
(38.739) (39.596)
1985 -1757.60*** 1996 -106.47***
(38.743) (39.849)
1986 -1776.59*** 1997 -77.70**
(38.775) (40.378)
1987 -1378.39*** 1998 -8.67
(38.797) (41.293)
1988 -1392.38*** 1999 -68.65
(38.817) (43.997)
1989 -1394.31*** Number of 11.93***
(38.848) Children (1.162)





1. ***, **, *: represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% confi-
dence levels, respectively.
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Table 5: Multicollinearity Between (Real Maximum
Credit × Age of the Youngest Child) and Other Ex-
planatory Variables
Variables
1979 102.10 1990 -60.01
(110.086) (123.869)
1980 -56.77 1991 873.41***
(107.236) (130.231)
1981 -197.53* 1992 1365.30***
(105.918) (137.122)
1982 -406.91*** 1993 1749.82***
(105.636) (148.693)
1983 -567.05*** 1994 4959.24***
(105.405) (159.773)
1984 -808.57*** 1995 5354.07***
(106.389) (173.241)
1985 -793.47*** 1996 5390.57***
(107.249) (187.923)
1986 -1059.54*** 1997 5731.23***
(110.717) (215.778)
1987 9.96 1998 4619.79***
(113.201) (257.442)
1988 -62.92 1999 1430.69***
(115.293) (356.694)
1989 -29.34 Number of 170.02***
(118.092) Children (18.343)
Constant -842.06*** Age Youngest 1371.73***




1. ***, **, *: represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10%
confidence levels, respectively.
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Table 6: Weighted Summary Statistics of Relevant Variables
Variables Sample Mean Variables Sample Mean
Dependent Variables (Time Limit)×
AFDC/TANF .16 < 5 Years Old .23
Participation (.37) (.42)
Work† .51 > 5, <= 10 .08
(.50) (.27)
> 10, <= 13 .02
(.15)
Effects of Policy Changes
(Two or More Kids) × Individual Characteristics
1989 .56 Education 10.78
(.50) (2.20)
1990 .55 Age of 508.2
(.50) Mother (197.27)
1991 .57 Other 2275.20
(.49) Income (7361.75)
1992 .58 Have 2 Kids .22
(.49) (.42)
1994 .60 Have 3 Kids .13
(.49) (.34)
1995 .59 4 + Kids .31
(.49) (.46)
1996 .71 Black .29
(.45) (.45)
1997 .82 Multi-Families .55
(.38) (.50)
1998 .82 < 5 Years Old .54
(.38) (.50)
1999 .82 > 5, <= 10 .24
(.39) (.42)






† Work is defined as having worked for more than 10 hours a week in
previous month.
‡ All monetary terms are in real 2000 dollars deflated by PCE deflator.
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Table 7: Estimation Results - Assuming Bivariate Normal Distribu-
tion
Coefficient Estimates Marginal Effects
Welfare Use Work† Welfare Use Work†
(Two or More Kids) ×
1989 .117 .205 .026 .082
(.148) (.128) (.035) (.051)
1990 .029 .102 .006 .041
(.109) (.094) (.023) (.037)
1991 .027 -.011 .006 -.004
(.091) (.079) (.020) (.031)
1992 -.091 .051 -.018 .021
(.065) (.056) (.012) (.022)
1994 .066 -.021 .014 -.008
(.073) (.061) (.016) (.024)
1995 -.014 .131 -.003 .052
(.116) (.095) (.024) (.038)
1996 -.198** .336*** -.038** .133***
(.095) (.080) (.017) (.031)
1997 -.429*** .361*** -.073*** .143***
(.109) (.091) (.014) (.035)
1998 -.521*** .241*** -.084*** .096***
(.114) (.095) (.013) (.037)
1999 -.312** .211** -.056*** .084**
(.129) (.097) (.019) (.039)
2000 -.190 .475** -.044 .185**
(.489) (.213) (.125) (.078)
(Time Limit)×
< 5 Years Old -.122** .145*** -.024** .058***
(.053) (.049) (.010) (.020)
> 5, <= 10 .013 -.064 .003 -.025
(.091) (.082) (.019) (.033)
> 10, <= 13 .290** .093 .070* .037
(.142) (.122) (.039) (.049)
(Work Requirement)×
< 5 Years Old .005 -.013 .001 -.005
(.054) (.049) (.011) (.019)
> 5, <= 10 .096 .071 .021 .028
(.089) (.082) (.020) (.033)
> 10, <= 13 -.089 -.288** -.018 -.112**
(.144) (.125) (.027) (.047)
[†] Work is defined as having worked for more than 10 hours a week in
previous month. ***, **, *: represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10%
confidence levels, respectively.
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Table 8: Marginal Effects on Probabilities Due to Policy Changes
Binary Decisions Four Alternatives
Welfare Work No Welfare No Welfare Welfare Welfare
No Work Work No Work Work
(Two or More Kids) × -.026** .053*** -.028 .054*** -.025** -.001
(Year>1993) (.013) (.022) (.019) (.021) (.012) (.002)
(Time Limit)×
< 5 Years Old -.026*** .070*** -.045*** .070*** -.026*** .0001
(.010) (.020) (.017) (.019) (.009) (.002)
> 5, <= 10 -.007 -.020 .025 -.018 -.005 -.002
(.019) (.034) (.030) (.033) (.017) (.003)
> 10, <= 13 .056 .036 -.077* .021 .041 .015
(.036) (.049) (.044) (.047) (.029) (.009)
(Work Requirement)×
< 5 Years Old -.004 .011 -.007 .011 -.004 .00002
(.011) (.019) (.017) (.019) (.010) (.002)
> 5, <= 10 .030 .044 -.065** .035 .021 .009**
(.021) (.034) (.029) (.032) (.018) (.005)
> 10, <= 13 .010 -.095* .080* -.091* .014 -.004
(.030) (.050) (.047) (.049) (.028) (.003)
ρ -.630***
(.014)
***, **, *: represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels, respectively.
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Table 9: Elasticities Estimates
Binary Decisions Four Alternatives
Welfare Work No Welfare No Welfare Welfare Welfare
No Work Work No Work Work
(Two or More Kids) × -.096** .047*** -.034 .049*** -.103** -.034
(Year>1993) (.050) (.019) (.022) (.019) (.048) (.083)
(Time Limit)×
< 5 Years Old -.050*** .031*** -.026*** .032*** -.055*** .003
(.020) (.009) (.010) (.009) (.020) (.036)
> 5, <= 10 -.005 -.003 .005 -.003 -.003 -.018
(.013) (.005) (.006) (.005) (.012) (.022)
> 10, <= 13 .010* .002 -.005* .001 .009 .023**
(.006) (.002) (.003) (.002) (.005) (.010)
(Work Requirement)×
< 5 Years Old -.007 .004 -.004 .005 -.008 .0003
(.019) (.008) (.009) (.008) (.018) (.032)
> 5, <= 10 .017 .006 -.013** .005 .014 .049***
(.011) (.005) (.006) (.005) (.011) (.020)
> 10, <= 13 .002 -.004* .005* -.004* .003 -.009
(.005) (.002) (.003) (.002) (.005) (.010)
***, **, *: represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels, respectively.
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Table 10: Marginal Effects - Different Age Groups
Birth Year 1965 and After Between 1956 and 1965 Before 1956
Welfare Work Welfare Work Welfare Work
Effects of Policy Changes
(Two or More Kids) × -.030 .065 -.066*** .069* -.028 .077***
(Year>1993) (.036) (.041) (.025) (.037) (.022) (.041)
(Time Limit)×
< 5 Years Old -.017 .017 -.027 .077*** -.012 .055
(.026) (.031) (.020) (.034) (.020) (.045)
> 5, <= 10 .066 -.037 -.012 -.015 -.017 .057
(.065) (.078) (.030) (.048) (.031) (.069)
> 10, <= 13 .675*** -.342** .099 .067 .011 .018
(.120) (.169) (.075) (.077) (.037) (.076)
(Work Requirement)×
< 5 Years Old .026 .009 -.001 -.023 -.023 -.034
(.027) (.030) (.023) (.036) (.019) (.049)
> 5, <= 10 .019 -.053 .036 .068 .042 -.035
(.061) (.076) (.034) (.045) (.039) (.074)
> 10, <= 13 -.193*** .130 -.002 -.143 .053 -.069
(.063) (.264) (.056) (.092) (.048) (.092)
Sample Proportion .24 .54 .14 .65 .09 .66
Observations 29,567 44,695 71,029
***, **, *: represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels, respectively.
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Table 11: Robustness Check: Bivariate Probit and Linear Prob-
ability Model Estimates
Bivariate Probit Linear Probability
Welfare Work Welfare Work
(Two or More Kids) × -.026** .053*** -.046*** .020***
(Year>1993) (.013) (.022) (.006) (.006)
(Time Limit)×
< 5 Years Old -.026*** .070*** -.021*** .024***
(.010) (.020) (.004) (.005)
> 5, <= 10 -.007 -.020 -.017*** -.015**
(.019) (.034) (.007) (.008)
> 10, <= 13 .056 .036 .002 -.009
(.036) (.049) (.010) (.012)
(Work Requirement)
< 5 Years Old -.004 .011 .009** -.019***
(.011) (.019) (.004) (.004)
> 5, <= 10 .030 .044 .018*** .032***
(.021) (.034) (.007) (.008)
> 10, <= 13 .010 -.095* .020** .018
(.030) (.050) (.011) (.012)
***, **, *: represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% confidence
levels, respectively.
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Table 12: Identification Check: Coefficient Esti-
mates Comparing Two and Three and More Chil-
dren
Welfare Use Work
Effects of Policy Changes
























< 5 Years Old -.398 -.103
(.253) (.312)
> 5, <= 10 .565 .362
(.380) (.481)
> 10, <= 13 -.318 1.510***
(.352) (.502)
(Work Requirement)×
< 5 Years Old -.127 -.582
(.229) (.435)
> 5, <= 10 -1.398*** -.802*
(.323) (.444)
> 10, <= 13 -.041 -1.964***
(.370) (.531)
***, **, *: represent significance at 1%, 5% and
10% confidence levels, respectively.
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(b) Work Decisions Given Welfare Status
Appendix
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A.1 Linear Probability Model
It is straightforward to estimate the joint probability of welfare use and work decisions
by using a nonlinear probability specification, such as the multinomial model. However,
there are two important disadvantages of nonlinear probability models. First, the marginal
effects of explanatory variables on probabilities are nonlinear functions of the estimated
coefficients. Not only is the interpretation not straightforward, but the calculation time
increases exponentially with sample size. Second, and more importantly, there is not yet an
empirical non-linear probabilistic model that consistently estimates a mother’s decisions
accounted for the mother’s fixed-effect. Due to these restrictions, the linear probability
model is the most adopted econometric specification in previous studies (see Table 3).
Since a linear probability model is binary, it estimates the “marginal” probability of
either welfare use or work. As a result, we have to specify two linear probabilities for each
of a single mother’s welfare use and work decisions. One issue arising from estimating a
marginal probability model is that we will not be able to know the compositional change
between mothers’ four alternatives due to either welfare time limits or the EITC expansion.
Since the marginal probability of making one decision, say welfare use, depends also
on the other decision, in this case, work, ignoring one decision when estimating the other
using a binary probability model will induce an omitted-variable problem and bias the
estimator. Most previous studies do not deal with this simultaneity issue in their binary
probabilistic specifications, with the notable exception of Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001).
Considering the above concerns, I specify a linear probability model of a single mother’s
decision, including the marginal probability of a mother’s one decision as explanatory
variable in the likelihood of the other decision, which will be discussed below. The model
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of welfare use can be described as follows. Work decision is defined similarly.































The definitions of variables follow that in Equation A.1. Also, Pr(Hist|Xist, D) is the
probability of work given all the observed characteristics of mothers; and εist captures the
unobserved factors that vary across individual, state, and yearly. Pr(Hist|Xist, D) in the
welfare likelihood estimation will be estimated by a mother’s random-effect probit models.
The rationale is that random-effect probit estimator is nonlinear in the observed variables
and εist. Therefore, the effect of δ can be identified.
An Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimator is biased because εist is correlated with
the observed explanatory variables. For instance, a state that set a time limit before
PRWORA (observed variable), may also be less generous to its support of low-income
families (unobserved variable), and in turn, poor families residing in this state are also less
likely to be on welfare. Also, single mothers with mental or physical problems (unobserved)
may be more likely to be on welfare, while receiving less education (observed). Another
important issue regarding the welfare use is the effect of business cycles. For example, it
is well known that the recession in the early 1990s is an important cause for the sudden
surge in welfare use during that same period of time.
These factors create an unobserved heterogeneity issue. I assume the unobserved factor
εist is separable by individual, state, and year:
εist = σi + µs + νt + u,
where u is an i.i.d. random disturbance. σi, µs, and νt can be controlled by adding
individual (mother), state, and year fixed-effect dummy variables, respectively.
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